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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
GEORGE LEWIS ALEJANDRE, 
Defendan^Appellant. 
Case No. 20050589-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF TURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a plea and sentence for Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (West 2004), and Attempted Failure to Respond to Officer's 
Signal to Stop, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-209 
(West Supp. 2005). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it imposed the statutory 
indeterminate prison terms, as recommended by both Adult Probation and Parole 
and the prosecutor? 
A trial court's sentencing decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. 
Helms, 2002 UT 12,11 8, 40 R3d 626. "The trial court abuses its discretion when it 
fails to consider all legally relevant factors, or if the sentence imposed exceeds the 
limits prescribed by law." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,11 66, 52 P.3d 1210 (citations 
omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (West 2004). Definitions - Sentences or 
combination of sentences allowed — Civil penalties — Hearing. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person 
convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of 
them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (West 2004). Felony conviction - Indeterminate 
term of imprisonment. 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment 
for an indeterminate term as follows: 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, unless the statute provides 
otherwise, for a term not to exceed five years. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant pled guilty to Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to 
Distribute, a third degree felony, and Attempted Failure to Respond to Officer's 
Signal to Stop, a class A misdemeanor. R13-14, 16-21, 38. The district court 
sentenced him to zero to five years at the Utah State Prison on the felony conviction, 
2 
and a concurrent sentence of one year on the misdemeanor conviction. R22-23,39. 
Defendant timely appealed. R25-27. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On March 22, 2005, police received a tip that defendant would be carrying 
marijuana that he intended to sell. R38:4. After spotting the vehicle in which he 
was a passenger, they signaled for the car to pull over. Id. Defendant told the 
driver to "step on the gas" and to evade the police. Id. In the course of the chase, 
defendant leapt from the car and tried to escape on foot. Id. As he fled, he dumped 
nearly two kilograms of marijuana in a nearby trash can. Id. The police soon 
cornered defendant and arrested him. Id. They also recovered the abandoned drugs 
and noticed that its packaging was consistent with marijuana that is packaged for 
sale. Id. Defendant admitted to the police that the marijuana was his and that he 
was trying to evade them. Id. He also confessed that he intended to sell the 
marijuana. R38:5. 
Defendant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute and attempted failure to respond to officer's signal to stop. R13-14,16-21. 
After hearing and accepting his guilty plea, the court referred him to Adult 
Probation and Parole (" AP&P") for a pre-sentence investigation report ("PSI"). Id. 
1
 Particulars of the crime are drawn solely from the prosecutor's description of 
the offense at a preliminary hearing, to which defendant did not object. 
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The PSI is not in the record.2 The record indicates, however, that defendant fell 
within the probation category on the sentencing matrix. R39:2. AP&P nevertheless 
recommended incarceration because of defendant's poor history in the probation 
system. R39:2. 
The prosecutor agreed with AP&P's recommendation. R39:3~4. In support of 
his position, the prosecutor discussed defendant's 'Very lengthy involvement with 
juvenile court starting in 1994 and basically running uninterrupted over the time 
period that he was an adult/7 R39:3. The prosecutor asserted that"probation is a 
privilege he does not take advantage of." R39:4. He continued by discussing 
defendant's adult criminal career, reminding the court that the PSI described 
defendant's failures in previous probation sentences: "[In] each and every one of 
them, he has either failed, having to have an affidavit filed, or ultimately terminated 
unsuccessfully because he hasn't taken advantage of it." Id. Further, the prosecutor 
argued that all of the programs defendant was requesting had been previously 
available to him in both the juvenile and adult penal systems. Id. 
2
 Appellant bears the burden of assuring an adequate record on appeal, and 
any gaps in the record are construed in favor of the trial court's decision. See State v. 
Harris, 2004 UT 103, f 46,104 P.3d 1250 ("[Wjhen an appellant fails to provide an 
adequate record on appeal, we must presume that the missing portions support the 
action of the district court.") (citation omitted). Thus, this Court should presume 
that any information in the PSI, but not in the record, supports the trial court's 
decision. 
4 
Defendant requested probation and enrollment in a rehabilitation program so 
that "he could get that type of stability and counseling for his drug problem and see 
if he [could] put his life in order/' R39:3, He notified the court that although he had 
been convicted of several misdemeanor charges in the past few years, this was his 
first felony. R39:2. He also informed the court that he had successfully completed 
probation programs resulting from juvenile adjudications. R39:3. 
The court examined the PSI and questioned defendant about whether he had 
fulfilled obligations imposed by previous sentences. R39:5. Although defendant 
claimed that he had paid a fine from a previous sentence, the court determined that 
he had only paid a small portion of it. Id. 
The court imposed a sentence of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison, to 
be served concurrently with a one-year sentence on the misdemeanor charge. 
R39:6. The court expressed concern that defendant had not abided by the conditions 
of probation previously granted by the courts and cited numerous occasions on 
which defendant had failed to comply with his probation requirements. Id. It 
agreed with the prosecutor that defendant had not availed himself of drug 
treatment programs in the past, although they had been readily available. Id. The 
court concluded that although defendant had "been given numerous opportunities 
for probation . . . [he] seemingly just [blew] them off/7 R39:7. The court 
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recommended credit for the 106 days defendant had already served. Id. Defendant 
did not object to the sentence. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant did not object to his sentence, and he has not argued plain error or 
exceptional circumstances. Thus his claim is unpreserved, and this Court should 
not consider it. 
Even if defendant had preserved his claim, it has no merit. Trial courts are 
granted wide discretion when imposing a sentence within the statutory scope 
provided by the legislature. Although they must consider all legally relevant 
factors, they are not required to make a record of their consideration of those factors, 
unless required by statute. When a court is not required to make such a record, a 
reviewing court may assume that the trial court considered those factors. In such 
cases, the reviewing court will overturn the sentence only if it is inherently unfair or 
excessive. The trial court in this case was not required by statute to make a record of 
its considerations in sentencing. Therefore, this court may assume that it considered 
the legally relevant factors. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT IS UNPRESERVED, AND IN ANY 
EVENT, THE TRIAL DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION. 
A, Defendant's arguments are unpreserved. 
Defendant did not make any objection or attempt to preserve his claims 
below, does not cite to the record showing that this issue was preserved in the trial 
court, and has not argued plain error on appeal. Thus, this Court need not address 
the merits of his claim. 
Generally, in criminal cases "a contemporaneous objection or some form of 
specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record 
before an appellate court will review such claim on appeal." State v. Johnson, 774 
P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 1989) (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 
546,551 (Utah 1987)). The objection below must "be specific enough to give the trial 
court notice of the very error .. . complained of/7 Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water 
Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457,460 (Utah App. 1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Beehive 
Medical Elecs., Inc. v. Square D Co., 669 P.2d 859,860 (Utah 1983)). The preservation 
rule "applies to every claim . . . unless a defendant can demonstrate that 
'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 
74/1fll/l0P.3d346. 
This Court recently held in State v. Johnson that a defendant's failure to raise a 
specific objection at a sentencing hearing served as a waiver of that issue on appeal. 
7 
2006 UT App 3, MI14-15,2006 WL 59783. In Johnson, the defendant pled guilty to two 
counts of attempted sex crimes against his granddaughters. Id. at 112. At sentencing, 
the trial court asked if there were any corrections that should be made to his PSI. Id. 
at 11 3. Johnson indicated that, based on his recollection of past events, there were 
inconsistencies in the report and that his score should be reduced by one or two 
points. Id. The court considered his argument, and received testimony from the 
probation officer that the information had been taken from defendant's BCI report. 
Id. The trial court ruled that because of the serious nature of the present offenses, one 
or two points would not make a difference in defendant's sentence. Id. at 1f 4. 
Johnson, although initially disputing the record of his 1978 conviction, "made no 
objection to [the court's] finding. Instead, defense counsel thanked the court and 
moved on " Id. at 1114. 
On appeal, Johnson contested the reliability of the BCI report. Id. at 11119,13. 
This Court held that this issue was not preserved, and that it was precluded from 
considering the merits of his argument. Id. at 111114-15. This Court noted that after 
the sentencing court's "determination was made, Johnson moved on without 
disputing the court's findings. . . . Johnson did not argue on appeal that the trial 
court committed plain error or that the case involve[d] exceptional circumstances." 
Id. at 1115. By failing to raise the issue before the sentencing judge, Johnson's actions 
8 
"constitute^] a waiver, precluding [this Court's] consideration of the issue on 
appeal/' Id. 
In this case, defendant's claims are similarly unpreserved. Although 
defendant presented mitigating factors to the court, he made neither a specific nor a 
general claim of error to the court. R39:5-7. He did not then argue, as he does now, 
that the court needed to consider the Galli factors in his sentencing. See Aplt. Br. at 
13-15. After hearing his sentence, defendant requested that the court recommend 
credit for time served, which the court granted, after which defendant merely 
replied, "Thank you, your honor/' R39:7. As a result, the trial court had no notice 
that defendant felt that the court's evaluation was insufficient. Because defendant 
did not specifically object to the court's sentencing decision, request the court to 
consider the Galli factors, or argue plain error or exceptional circumstances on 
appeal, defendant has waived this issue. See Johnson, 2006 UT App 3,1115. 
B. Trial courts are given broad discretion in sentencing, and there 
is no evidence that the court did not consider all legally 
relevant factors or imposed an inherently unfair or excessive 
sentence. 
Even if defendant had preserved his claim, the claim is meritless. 
Defendant contends that "[t]he trial court abused its discretion in this case 
because it failed to consider all the legally relevant factors and it imposed an 
excessive sentence." Aplt. Br. at 12. But he cites no cases in which a court has held 
9 
that a prison sentence, in lieu of probation, was "clearly excessive/7 Id. at 16. 
Further, he applies case law on consecutive sentencing requirements to a claim 
involving concurrent sentencing. See Aplt. Br. at 13-15 (citing State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 
930, 938 (Utah 1998)). Defendant's arguments lack merit. 
Defendants face a particularly heavy burden when challenging a trial court's 
sentence. An appeals court "will not overturn a sentence unless it exceeds statutory 
or constitutional limits, the judge failed to consider all the legally relevant factors[,] 
or the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute abuse of 
discretion." State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, 11 3, 73 P.3d 991 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Simply put, "the fact that [a defendant] views 
his situation differently than did the trial court does not prove that the trial court 
neglected to consider the [legally relevant] factors." State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12,1114, 
40 P.3d 626. The decision to grant or deny probation "is within the complete 
discretion of the trial court." State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048,1049 (Utah App. 1991). 
In other words, "[t]he trial court has broad discretion in imposing sentence within 
the statutory scope provided by the legislature." Id. at 1051. 
A sentencing court is not required to state on the record its consideration of 
every legally relevant factor. Helms, 2002 UT 12, 1f 11. Instead, this Court may 
assume that the sentencing court considered the factors unless (1) an ambiguity of 
facts makes the assumption unreasonable, (2) a statute explicitly requires written 
10 
findings, or (3) a prior case states that findings on the issue must be made. Id. at 11 
11. If a court is not required to make a record of its considerations, the sentence will 
be overturned only if "it is inherently unfair or clearly excessive." Id. at 1f 14. 
In this case, the sentencing court ordered a pre-sentencing investigation 
report, and reviewed its contents with both parties. R38:5,39:2-7. After this review, 
the court accepted the recommendations of AP&P and the prosecutor, and 
sentenced defendant to the statutorily prescribed sentence: an indeterminate term of 
imprisonment from zero to five years. R39:7; see Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201(2) & 
76-3-203(3) (West 2004). No abuse of discretion occurred. 
Defendant relies on State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), in arguing that the 
trial court failed to consider all legally relevant factors when imposing defendant's 
sentence. Aplt. Br. at 13-15. Galli was tried and convicted by three separate courts 
for committing a string of armed robberies. 967 P.2d at 931-33. He was sentenced to 
five years to life on each count. Id. at 932-33. On the second and third convictions, 
the judges ordered that the sentence they imposed would run consecutive with his 
other sentences. Id. The Utah Supreme Court upheld his convictions, but reversed 
the imposition of Galli's consecutive sentences. Id. at 938-39. The court explained 
that when deciding to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences for multiple 
felony convictions, the trial court must consider certain mitigating factors as 
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required by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (West 1998). Id. at 938. The record indicated 
that the courts had not considered all the circumstances laid out by statute. Id. 
Defendant's reliance on Galli is misplaced. "Galli construed only the 
consecutive sentencing statute—Utah Code section 76-3-401 —which requires the 
trial court to consider the Defendant's rehabilitative needs and criminal history/' 
State v. Olsen 2005 UT App 137, *1, 2005 WL 615120 (unpublished memorandum 
decision, attached as addendum). When a defendant challenges a court's decision to 
incarcerate him rather than grant probation, Galli is inapplicable. Id. 
This Court should look instead to its decision in State v. Olsen. The facts of 
this case are remarkably similar to those in Olsen. After a guilty plea, Olsen 
contended that his sentence was excessive, although he did not argue that it 
"exeed[ed] legally prescribed limits." Id. at *1 n.l. In fact, this Court noted that 
during his plea, Olsen had recognized that the court could impose the statutory 
sentence. Id. at *1. Olson also improperly relied on Galli, which "construed only the 
consecutive sentencing statute." Id. Because his case did not involve consecutive 
sentencing, but a "single indeterminate prison term of zero to five years . . . Galli 
[was] inapplicable." Id. This Court also reminded Olsen that a "'defendant is not 
entitled to probation.'" Id. (quoting Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051). After noting that the 
trial court had the opportunity to personally observe Olsen, and was in the best 
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position to determine whether probation was more appropriate than prison time, 
this Court affirmed his sentence. Id. 
This case is nearly identical to Olsen. Defendant was sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of zero to five years, as prescribed by statute. R22-23, R39:6; see 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203 (West 2004). His citation to Galli is equally unavailing 
because defendant did not receive consecutive felony sentences. R22-23, R39:6. 
Prior to sentencing, defendant acknowledged that the court could impose "0-5 USP 
[Utah State Prison]" for his crime. R16. The court examined defendant and 
determined that probation was not appropriate. R39:6-7. Like Olsen, defendant 
does not cite to any evidence that his sentence exceeds the legally prescribed limits. 
Rather, the punishment fits the crime. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201(2) & 76-3-
203(3) (West 2004). 
Defendant suggests that because the court did not"acknowledge or address" 
certain mitigating factors when announcing its decision, it did not consider them. 
Aplt. Br. at 13. However, the court is not required to make a record of each legally 
relevant factor, and it is reasonable for this Court to assume that it considered them. 
See Helms, 2002 UT 12, 11 11. This Court "will not assume that the trial court's 
silence, by itself, presupposes that the court did not consider the proper factors as 
required by law/7 Id. The proffer of evidence in this case is similar to that in Helms, 
and "[t]he proffer of a brief sentencing order and the existence of circumstances 
13 
favorable to [defendant]" does not meet the burden placed upon defendant. Id. at 
1116. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's sentence. 
Respectfully submitted February 3,2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MATTHEW D. BATES 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Addendum 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Robert H. Olsen Jr., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAR 1 7 2005 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20030902-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 1 7 , 2 0 0 5 ) 
2005 UT App 137 
Second District, Ogden Department 
The Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
Attorneys: Dee W. Smith, Ogden, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Joanne C. Slotnik, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Jackson. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant Robert H. Olsen Jr. appeals his sentence after 
pleading no contest to possession of methamphetamine in violation 
of Utah Code section 58-37-8(2), a third degree felony. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (2002). 
"A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the 
trial court has abused its discretion, failed to consider all 
legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds 
legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). " ' [T]he exercise of discretion in 
sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the 
court and the appellate court can properly find abuse only if it 
can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view 
adopted by the trial court.1" Id. (alteration in original) 
(quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)). 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
by sentencing him to an indeterminate prison term of zero to five 
years, rather than probation, because it "failed to consider all 
the legally relevant factors and imposed an excessive sentence."1 
Specifically, Defendant avers that the trial court failed to 
consider his rehabilitative needs and lack of criminal history. 
In support of this argument, Defendant relies on State v. 
Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998). However, Galli construed only 
the consecutive sentencing statute--Utah Code section 76-3-401--
which requires the trial court to consider the Defendant's 
rehabilitative needs and criminal history. See Galli, 967 P. 2d 
at 938; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (2003). The 
present case does not involve consecutive sentencing. Rather, 
for his felony conviction, Defendant was sentenced to a single 
indeterminate prison term of zero to five years pursuant to Utah 
Code section 76-3-203(3). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3) 
(2003). Thus, Galli is inapplicable. 
Moreover, a "defendant is not entitled to probation, but 
rather the [trial] court is empowered to place the defendant on 
probation if it thinks that will best serve the ends of justice 
and is compatible with the public interest." State v. Rhodes, 
818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). "'The granting or 
withholding of probation involves considering intangibles of 
character, personality[,] and attitude, of which the cold record 
gives little inkling.'" Id. at 1049 (citation omitted). 
In the instant case, the trial judge had the opportunity to 
personally observe Defendant. As such, the trial judge, rather 
than the appellate court, was in the best position to determine 
whether prison or probation was more appropriate to "serve the 
ends of justice and . . . the public interest." Id. at 1051. 
Furthermore, Defendant avowed, before pleading, that he 
understood that the court could impose up to a maximum penalty of 
zero to five years in prison. "The fact that defendant is 
disappointed writh the sentence imposed does not mean it is 
1. Although Defendant argues that the trial court imposed an 
"excessive sentence," he does not claim that the sentence 
"exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 
454, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). To be clear, it does not. 
Possession of methamphetamine, a Schedule II narcotic, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-4(b) (iii) (B) (2002), is a third degree felony. 
See id. § 58-37-8(2) (b) (ii) (2002). Utah Code section 76-3-203 
permits indeterminate sentencing "[i]n the case of a felony of 
the third degree . . . for a term not to exceed five years." Id. 
§ 76-3-203 (2003). 
improper." State v. Wanlass, 953 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) (per curiam). 
Accordingly, Defendant's sentence is affirmed. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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